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In the 
SUPREME COURT. 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
niO~TE ~lOSES, doing business as 
Rancho Packing Co., 
Plaintiff, Resp1ondent, 
vs. 
ARCHIE McFARLAND and SONS, 
a corporation, 
Defendant, Appellant. 
Case No. 
7548 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
WARWICK C. LAMOREAUX 
DAVID K. WATKISS 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PRELIMIINARY ·STATEMENT 
The parties are referred to as in the court below. 
Plaintiff brought this action in the District Court · 
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for Salt Lake County; and following a trial before the 
Court 'Sitting without a jury, a judgement for the plain-
tiff was entered in the sum of $2,686.98. 
The amended complaint alleged that on or about 
the 2-8th day of Oetober, 1947, plaintiff and defendant 
entered into a contract by the terms of which the plain-
tiff agreed to buy and the defendant agreed to sell 30,000 
lbs. of boneless mutton at 241f2 cents per pound, and the 
defendant agreed to deliver such merchandise at the rate 
of 5,000 .pounds per week; that defendant delivered only 
I 
6,635 ·pounds and refused to deliver the remaining 
23,365 lbs., thereby necessitating the plaintiff, in order 
to mitigate his damages , to purchase this amount on 
the open market which caused him a loS's of $2,686.98. 
By way of answer defendant admits selling meat 
to the plaintiff, but alleges that it was on an ''open 
order" basis, and that such orders were ·subject to 
confirmation and aeceptance by the defendant's home 
office in Sallt Lake; that the defendant was first ap-
praised of this claimed ''order'' of sale under which 
plaintiff ·is suing in January, 1948, and ·at that time 
declined to aceept it but promised to shi,p all they 
could get to the plaintiff; that at the time of his 
conversation the price of mutton was 29lf2c per lb. 
Fro1n the facts hereinafter related, it will appear 
that the evidence clearly indicated that there was · 
no lawful contract entered into between the parties, 
for 30,000 pounds of boneless m.utton at 24lf2 cents 
per pound as alleged. 
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B. TI-IE~ FACTS 
The defendant is a wholesale meat ~packing corpora-
tion ·w·-ith its principal plnr0 of business at Salt Lake 
City. It is a large organization doing business through-
out the Intermountain area, and also the Pacific 
coast. The defendant, as is the custom in the meat 
packing business, employs sale·smen to find markets 
for its merchandise. At the time in question· the 
defendant had a sales ·office in San Francisco that 
emplo~Yed 5 salesmen, one of vYhom was Domenith C. 
Baso lo. ( R. 84) 
~he plaintiff, 1fonte Moses, is an individual doing 
business in the name of Rancho Packing Company, 
with its principal .place of business at Los Angeles. 
This plaintiff is a manufacturer of luncheon meats 
and as such purchases various types of meat throu~h­
out the country. (R. 13,40) The parties had never 
before clone any business. (R .. 20) 
On the 28th day of October, 1947, defendant's 
s11e ·man Baso1o phoned plaintiff long distance (R. 49) 
:-tnd received from -him four orders for meat. (~xhibit 
9) rl'he fi1·st order was for 30,000 lbs. of boneless 
mutton which was represented as presently on hand, 
and in the freezer. (R. 37) Plaintiff then stated he 
would l}ke an adfli tional 30,000 pounds of the same 
produep shipped 3000 to 5000 pounds per week. (R.45) 
Two additional orders were giYen, one for 5000 
pounds- of ·pigs feet, ·and one for Gullet meat and 
lamh chf'Pks. (.U.. 60, Exhibit 9) 
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Order Refused 
The salesman Baso1lo telephoned Mr. Me Far-
land, general manager of the defendant, told him· of 
the orders. ( (R.88) D1efendant accepted the order 
for the presently existing car of frozen mutton, and 
shipped 27,716 pounds the next day. (R. 88, 78, Exhibit 
1) As to the second order for the same commodity, 
it was refused for the reason that there was no mutton 
available. (R.88) The product results from the cull-
ing of sheep herds as they move from summer to 
winter pasture, and is only available in small quan-
tity in defendant's territory from September to the 
forepart of October. (R. 77) Defendant told Basolo 
plaintiff could have the· product "as available" on 
an open order basis. At the time Moses ordered the 
second lot of mutton, Basolo told him, testified Moses, 
that the latter had purchased all of the supply of 
boneless mutton. (R. 45) Nevertheless, plaintiff con-
tends that Basolo ''sold'' him the order sued upon. 
Plaintiff knew that Bosolo had not conferred ·with 
the r):1ant at tl1P tiTHe the al1eged contract waR en-
tered. (R. 46) Basolo had no authority to accept orders. 
His employer had instructed him to take orders and 
con1municate them to the plant for acceptance. (R. 87) 
There was no course of dealing between litigants, or 
between the salesman and plaintiff. Moses "assumed'' 
Basolo had contacted the plant about the transaction. 
(R. 47) 
The San Francisco office sent evidence of the 
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four transactions to defendant in the form of the 
usual ''house order'' form, E~hibit 9. Plaintiff also 
rPnei, .. ec +he ~flirl fnrrns. (R .. 69) The contested order 
is page 4 of that exhibit, S·pecially marked Exhibit I. 
On its face shipping instructions are stated to be "as 
aYailable''; however_, there are later words about 
minimum shipments of 3'000 pounds per week. 
Phlintiff issued its purchase order, No. 7001, Exhibit 
''A."~ however, there is no evidence defendant received 
a copy thereof. The order number appears on a 
letter written hy Basolo to· plaintiff dated October 29, 
wherein the salesman undertook to confirm the order 
for the second shipment of mutton in installments. 
In said letter, Exhibit "B", is a statement that ''we 
have advised the plant that lots of less than 3000 lbs. 
are not desireable.'' The plant had been so advised, 
hut rejected the order on that basis. (R, 88) The 
letter said nothing about 30,000 pounds. What amount-
ed to a counter offer was given by the pl~ant to ship 
as available on an open order basis. (R. 88). Exhibit 
'' B'' statrs Basolo \:\,Tas district manager. He hafl 
no authority to use this title and took it on him-
self to so designate ·himself, the defendant knowing 
nothing about it until 7 months later. (R. 105) 
Shipment of the four orders commenced at once. 
The order for the mutton on hand was shipped on 
October ~9th, but was several thousand pounds short. 
(Exhibit 1) There were six shipments of mutton 
thereafter during the next few weeks, but each ship-
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ment was for le-ss than 3000 pounds. (E·xhibits 2 to 7, 
inclusive) The last three were priced out higher than 
the alleged order for 30,000 pounds .at 24¥2 cents, and 
the plaintiff paid without question the higher price. (R. 
69 and Exhibit 8) 
M.oses Phones Me F~arland 
Sometime near Jan nary 9, 1948, plaintiff phoned 
Me F'arland and observed that he had a contract for 
30,000 pounds of mutton but it wasn't coming through. 
(R .. 28) Mr. 1\fc Farland stated there was no contract, 
but that shi·pments had been, and would be made on an 
open order basis, but that there was no product avail-
able. (R. H1) 
Immediately thereafter, plaintiff wrote Exhibit "C'' 
rehearsing some of -vvhat it deemed to be the understand-
ing and asked for shipments. Mr. Me Farland replied 
with Exhibit "D" on January 15th and stated there 
was no product, that it was almost impossible to obtain, 
that there were no sheep coming to market, that he would 
do his utmost to get some mutton as referred to in the 
le~ter. ~tfr. 1v.Ic Farl.:1nd always understood the matter 
as an ''as available'' transaction. (R. 88) All during 
this time, from the shortage from 3000 ~pounds in the 
first shipment to April 28, 1948, pl'aintiff was buying 
the product in the open market. (R. 51, 31, 63) The 
price was rising from the time of the purchase alleged 
to have . been made from defendant; This plaintiff 
knew. (R. 33, 52) At the time of· the phone call and 
letter with and from Me Farland, the market was 
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about :29~~ cents. (R. 94) A purchase of 27,680 pounds 
of mutton 'Yas made by plaintiff on April 28, 
19:18 at 3-1 ('C)nts, and plaintiff demanded and sued 
for the difference between the alleged contract price 
of ~-!~~ cents and the 3-1 cents, plus two eents for 
transportation cost. 
The court granted judgement as prayed. 
STATE~fENT OF ERRORS 
I. 
The trial court erred in entering its finding that 
there was a sale of 30,000 p·ounds of boneless· mutton 
for the following re'asons : 
1. The salesman of defendant had no author-
ity to enter into a contract with plaintiff. 
2. The defendant had a right to ·accept or 
reject orders from its salesman. The order sub-
mitted by plaintiff was rejected. A counteroffer to 
send ll1Utton "as available" was given in its stead. 
3. :Shipments made by defendant to plaintiff 
did not constitute an ·acce:ptance of any contract. 
4. Defendant at no time ratified the alleged 
contract made between plaintiff and s·alesman 
Basolo. 
II. 
The pl'aintiff waived his right to damages for the 
deficiencies in the first five ·shipments. 
III. 
Plaintiff did not properly mitigate dam·ages. The 
judgment for money is excessive. 
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ARGUMENT 
I~ 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING 
ITS FINDING THAT THERE WAS A SALE Q]j., 
30,000 POUNDS OF BONELE:SS MUTTON FOR 
THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 
1. THE SALESMAN OF DEFENDANT 
HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO A 
CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF. 
The trial court found as a fact that defendant, 
through its agent Basolo, sold plaintiff 30,000 pounds 
of boneless mutton. (R. 9) It is contended by de-
fendant and ap-pellant here that the agent had no 
authority to so bind his principal in a sale of this 
kind and that the finding is error. 
At the threshold, we must examine the facts in 
terms of the generally accepted principle of law stat-
ed by the Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
It has been stated to be the general rule 
that a traveHng salesman has no authority to 
ma.ke a binding contract of sale without the 
approval or acceptance of the principal, unless 
expressly so authorized. Generally the extent 
of his authority is to solicit orders and trans-
mit them. FLOOR vs. MITCHELL, 41 P. 2d, 
281-286, 1935_. 
There was no evidence of prior dealing so that 
an agency by estoppel might be claimed or an appa-
rent agency. The transaction in question was the fir~t 
ever made between the parties. ( R. 69, 20) The only 
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eon1petent evidence then to establish Basolo 's auth-
ority "'"ere the instructions given him by his emp~loyer. 
Ba~clo \Yn~ n ~nlt.:.6llH1n for defendant McFarl~and, 
as one of five such in the San Francisco territory 
sales office (R. 99, 14, 85). He had been specifically 
instructed, as \Yere ·all salesman of defendant 
Only t\YO persons in the defendant organization 
had authority to accept orders, Paul McFarland, 
g·eneral manager, and Fr·ank Lees, the sales manager. 
(R 95) 
Basolo assumed to use a false title, that of 
District :Nianager. He was not the district manager. 
~Ir. ~fcFarland, testified that Basolo took the title 
"on himself to use," and that it was not until seven 
months after the transaction in question and that 
Basolo was no longer with the com;pany, that the 
manager of defendant knew he had used the false 
title. (R 105 This information came from plaintiff 
in the form of Exhibit B. 
Concurrently with the transactions herein taking 
place, Basolo was acting as a broker for other de~aler8. 
(R 86) 
It is to be born in mind that statements of the 
agent cannot be relied upon as to his authority for 
the reason that persons dealing with an agent assume 
the risk of lack of authority. 2 Am. Jur. 76. 
The plaintiff has the burden of .proof of agency. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that one who has 
dealt \Yith an agent or who has availed himself of 
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the act of an agent must in order to charge the prin-
cipal, prove the authority under which the agent acted, 
in other words, it has cast upon him the burden of 
establishing the agent's authority to bind the prin-
cipal by the act or contract in controversy. 
~CAMPBELL vs. GOWANS 100 P 397, 35 
u 268. 
Mr. Moses, the plaintiff, knew that Basolo did 
not have authority to make a firm contract for bone-
less mutton. In the first place, it is clear from the 
testimony of Mr. Moses that Basolo at no time prior 
to the transaction in controversy had contacted the 
home office, or anyone in authority, with respect to 
the order. (R 46, 47) It was the salesman acting 
alone in response to the offer of plaintiff to purchase. 
There was no confirmation to .plaintiff and indeed Mr. 
Moses stated that in most of his deals, he does not 
rely on confirmation. (R 74) 
It is to be kept in mind that the order in question 
was a part of four orders for meat all bearing the 
same date, October 28, 1947. (Exhibit 9) It all occur-
ed in one telephone conversation from the salesman 
in San Francisco, to plaintiff Moses in J_jos Angeles. 
(R 20, 58, 69) The' first order was for a car load of 
boneless muttbn presently existing (R 78) Mr. Moses 
testified that Basolo ''offered the sale of this car load 
of mutton, representing himself as being able to sell 
it to us, and describing it. We agreed to buy." (R 37) 
. This car load had been accumulated over several 
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"\Yeeks of culling of sheep in the desert country moving 
from summer to "\\"'inter range. (R 77) The salesman 
ccnh{ not sf\11 th~s meat 'Yithout confirmation from 
the plant. ( R 85, 87) 
SENNER & J(APLAN v. GERA MILLS 
173 NYS 265 
.. A. careful reading of the record will discose that 
it "\Yas in the same telephone conversation that Mr. 
~loses then asked for a second order of the same 
product, in the amount of 30,000 pounds, to be shipped 
weekly from 3000 to 5000 pounds :per shipment. 
(R 20, 58, 69) Mr. l\foses testified that he knew he was 
purchasing a scarce commodity that was in some 
sections unavailable at some times of the year (R 52); 
that "certain sections. would dry up" when the 
packers were ''through · with their run. ' ' ( R 41) 
Boneless mutton he said "isn't an all-year proposi-
tion in any one section . . . In a sheep section like 
this (Utah) it's an item that comes for a time and 
then stops off . . . these mutton are old ewes that 
have been culled for1n the herds.'' (R 41) 
The salesman Basolo telephoned the two orders 
to McFarland for confirmation. (R 88) The first 
order for the boneless mutton on hand was accepted 
and was shipped the following day. (R 88, 79, Exhibit 
1) The order for the second lot of mutton was reject-
ed as follows : 
A. Basolo said that Rancho Pack would 
also take another thirty thousand pounds of 
mutton if we could get it, and I immediately 
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told' him it wasn't available . . . . We said 
we didn't have another thirty thousand pounds 
of mutton, w~ .probably couldn't get it, but 
that we would ship on an open order all the 
boneless mutton we eould get through." (R 88) 
Plaintiff bought the product regularly and testi-
fied it was always available somewhere. (R 41) He 
testified he could have purchased mutton elsewhere 
on October 28, 194 7, at the same price. ( R 46) He 
bought in the South and from Chicago generally. 
(R40) 
At the time of the telephone conversation with 
Basolo wherein the carload of existing mutton was 
ordered, and after Mr. Moses had offered to purchase 
another 30,000 pounds, Mr. Moses testified that Basolo 
told him that he, Mr. Moses, had "bought our supply, 
you have already bought our present supply.'' (R 
45, 46) However, Mr. Moses then testified that the 
salesman was confident that more supply V\rould be 
. 'avail~able. lie testified Basolo had said: 
" .... but we do have these coming up. 
We are going to have them right along every 
week. We are in no position to accumulate a 
shipment of twenty five or thirty thousand 
pounds, but we will have them coming in each 
week. Now would you be satisfied to receive 
five thousand pounds per' week~" (R 45) 
It is submitted that in terms of the record, the 
above testimony, and that immediately- following, can-
not be believed; but if it is accepted, Moses should 
have checked with the plant. Mr. Moses said: 
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• • You ran send us as little as three thous-
and pounds, but no less than that. He said, 
• • On that basis I will contract with you to meet 
the operat1on. \v""e have a truck coming in each 
"·eek and "·ill drop off three to five thousand 
pounds each week'' and I insisted on convey-
ing to him that if he failed to do that he would 
be putting us on a spo.t be·cause we had possi-
bilit·ies at that tinte of buy~ing mutton at that 
price .. , (R 46) 
Here we have the ·plaintiff advised that there is 
no more presently existing supply; plaintiff further 
understands the difficulties in the desert country of 
procuring· supply, kno\Ying that some areas dry up at 
the end of the season's run, knowing that he can get 
it in some other locality at the same price. And yet 
he \vas willing to try to enter a contract with a mere 
salesman for that large quantity of a scarce item! 
Apparent authortity is never contructed from such 
tenuous tissue! ''One should always use proper 
vigilence in dealing with another; he cannot close his 
eyes to information -vvhich lies within his easy· grasp.'' 
Angerosa v. ··White Co., 290 N.Y.S. 204, 248 App. Div. 425. 
Johnson v. Shook & Fletcher Supply Co., 
16 So. 2d, 406. 
Plaintiff ~foses had had no course of dealing with 
Basolo, nor with 1fcFarland. This was the first and 
only transaction with either of them. (R 20, 34, 45, 
58) And pla.intiff knew that there was no immediately 
avaih1 ble stock of. mutton to support the order. He 
himself testified that he was so advised by the sales-
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man. (R 45, 46) Why should plaintiff undertake 
to tie up such a large supply at the wrong season of 
the year, · through a salesman who had advised him 
of the lack of present supply, when plaintiff knew 
that he could get his product at the same price in 
another market~ He had notice that it would be re-
quired of defendant to get the product from mutton 
then on the hoof. ( 45) It was not ·contemplated that 
the salesman was to enter the market for the .purchase 
of processed mutton. It was that weekly supply they 
were evidently talking about. 
Mr. Moses is a large operator. The order from 
defendant is "but a drop in the bucket", (R 38), and 
he. had another supply, (R 46), yet he saw fit to deal 
with a traveling salesman who actually had no auth-
ority, and who put the plaintiff on notice that there 
was no present ability to perform. Plaintiff had 
notice that it was a future anticipated supply to be 
depended upon. 
Moses testified that the contract was formed in 
the telephone conversation. (R 49) This was before 
any attempted confirmation by Basolo with the plant. 
,In other words, plaintiff takes position and the court 
below so found (R 6) that the salesman had the 
authority to contract at the time of the first telephone 
conversation, that it was unnecessary for the latter 
to get assent from the plant. 
· Let it also be remembered that Basolo did tele-
phone the plant immediately thereafter. He received 
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(1) confirmation of the first order for boneless 
mutton, and (~) refusal of the order for the sceond 
lot of the same product for the reason that none was 
aYailable. ( R. 88) In other vvords, any possible 
authority the sales1nan n1ight be· held to have had at 
the tin1e of the telephone conversations to sell the 
future prospective supply of boneless mutton, was 
specifically countermanded by Mr. McFarland. 
Plaintiff had a duty to inguire into the authority 
of the salesman. 
''A person dealing with a known agent is 
not authorized under any circumstances blindly 
to trust the agent's statements as to the extent 
of his powers; such person must not act negli-
gently, but must use reasonable diligence and 
prudence to ascertain whether the agent acts 
within the scope of his powers. In other words, 
a person dealing with an ·agent assumes the 
risk of lack of authority in the agent. He can-
not charge the principal by relying upon the 
agent's assun1ption of authority which proves 
to be unfounded." 2 Am. J ur. 76 
Dayton Bread Co. v. Montana Flour Co. 126 
F2 257, 1942 
Johnson v. Shook & Fletcher Supply Co., 
16 So. 2d, 406. 
ANHEUSER BU.SI-I v. GROVIER STARR, 
128 F.2, 146. 
CHESSOM v. RICI-IMOND CEDAR 
VVORKS, 89 S.E. 800. 
American N·at. Bank v. B·artlett, 40 F.2, 21. 
WHEELER v. McGUIRE, 2 L.R.A. 808; 
86 Ala. 398 ; 5 s.o. 190. 
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As to whether the agent was acting within the 
scope of his authority, suppose he had ~een given an 
order for 300,000 or even three million pounds of 
critical material~ Could it be said then that plaintiff 
could believe that the salesman was acting within the 
scope of his pow~rs ~ 
I-Iad plaintiff made any inquiry, or even called 
Basolo back .after the latter had communicated the 
orders to the plant, he would have learned whether 
the salesman was acting within or without his powers. 
Of course it is the position of plaintiff that Basolo 
did not attempt to con tract in the telephone conver-
satio;n prior to his conferring with the plant; however, 
plaintiff grounds his whole case on the assumption 
that Basolo had the authority at the time of· the 
single phone conversation, and that the contract was 
then and there made. (R. ,49) The -court bel9w so 
found. (R. 6) 
If Mr. Moses had been really concerned about tie-
ing up a source of supply (amounting to a drop in 
the bucket) he woulQ. have determined whether or 
not the plant had or would sanction an order amount-
ing to 72,000 pounds of a critical commodity. (R. 38) 
Mr. Moses testified that he knew at the time of the 
order that the salesman was not conferring with the 
plant, that Moses did 'nt have any staternent from 
Basolo · with respect to his arrangement with 
McFarland in California." (R. 46) In fact, Mr. 
Th1oses testified that there W'as nothing said about the 
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salesrnan conferring 'Yith l\lr. 1\feFarland in Salt Lake 
City, .but 1\lr. 1\[oses, ~~certainly assumed that he 
had." (R. 47) 
Johnson v. Shook & Fletcher Supply Co., 
16 So. 2d, 406. 
The letter 'Yritten by Basolo, (Exhibit B), did 
not haYe authority of the plant and it does not on 
its face suggest it. All that i's said is that the plant 
has been .. 'advised'' that lots of less than 3000 pounds 
are not desirable. Whether this letter was written 
before or after the instructions from McFarland is 
now kno\\-n. But it is clear that there was no author-
, 
i ty from the plant to write it. 
That the salesman did not confer with the plant 
before making ·the alleged contract wa.s of no concern 
to plaintiff, for he testified that it was not his prac-
tice to attem-pt confirn1ation. He testified that he did 
a lot of business with l~arge brokerage houses of 
the nation, and that "in most cases the transactions 
that I have had with them have been done without 
confirmation." (R. 74) Confirmation with him vvas 
uncon1mon. (R.71) With defendant a must. (R. 87) 
The importance of confirmation was illustrated 
in the record by defendant's counsel calling attention 
to plaintiff of a statement appearing on the letter-
head of the brokerage firm with which plaintiff did 
the business of purchasing in the open market to 
"mitigate" his damages as a result of the failure of 
this defendant to ship the mutton. Mr. Moses stated 
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he was familiar with the language and policy of the 
James Company that ''all' our offerings, verbal, 
telegraph or mail, are subject to seller's confirmation 
unless specifically quoted firm." (R. 74) In other 
words, the James Company required confirmation of 
the buyer from it, with the seller. The buyer was and . 
is warned by that plain spoken language that where 
there was no ttemp~t to get a sellers confirmation, 
there was no contract. The broker is in a somewhat 
similar position as a salesman. The house, or the 
plant reserved the right to affirm or disaffirm the 
orders taken by the broker. And why not~ 
· Where would the large modern · plant be if it 
did not require salesman to submit ·their orders~ 
When the demand exceeds the supply, as was the case 
in 194 7 ( R. 87), salesman and brokers could over sell 
the supply and produce chaos. It is the rule in all 
business that a mere traveling salesman does not 
commit the supplier in the absence of a firm quotat-
ion or offering. Credit considerations if nothing 
else, would dictate that the ordinary salesman could 
not of himself close a contract for goods involving 
many thousand of dollars. 
Wrenn v. Ehrlich 194 A. 534 
Senner & Ka:plan v. Gera Mills, 173 N.Y.S. 
265, 185 App. Div.. 562 
Under the pleadings of plaintiff, his proof, and 
the findings of the trial court, the case is one where a 
bi-lateral contract is clain1ed and found to exist, that 
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is, a p-romise for a promise. The promise from defen-
dant 'vould either have to come from the salesman 
having authority, or, inconsistent with the findings of 
the court, the act of shipping by defendant would con-
stitute promise to ship all of the ordered merchandise. 
The court found it came from the salesman 'B author-
ity. 
There 'Yas never a bi-lateral agreement. Basolo 
did not promise anything, and even though he had 
he had no authority to promise. The shipments made 
were on the basis of the instruction given Basolo when 
he phoned the plant, that there was no available supply, 
but that such as could be had would be shipped on 
an open order basis. (R. 88) The court may have had 
such a formation of contract in its mind, but there is 
no find_ing to that effect. The finding is to the con-
trary, that the agreement was the immediate result 
of the phone conversation. (R. 6) 
\Vhat actually happened w.as that plaintiff simply 
made an offer for a bi-lateral contract which was re-
jected. A counter offer was given by the plant that 
as there was no firm supply available, the order 
would be filled on an open -order basis. (R. 88) The 
plaintiff had the duty to ascertain the scope of 
authority of the salesman, and the salesman had the 
instructions forth,vith. The buyer from the s·alesman 
buys at his peril as heretofore stated. If the agent 
has no authority, the intending buyer does not buy. 
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Rietz vs. Martin, 12 Ind. 306, 74 Am. Dec. 215, 24 
R.C.L. 387. 
The result of what happened in October, 1947, 
was that there was set up a series of unilateral con-
tracts. The salesman had no authority but to com-
municate the order, and that he did. Anything further 
that he did was a nulity. 
The law of the pl·ace of contracting, California, 
requires that Basolo's authority must be in writing 
before the contract would be valid under the .Statute 
of Frauds. 
The California Civil Code 2309 provides as follows: 
''An oral authorization is sufficient for 
any purpose except that an authority to enter 
with a written contract required by law to be 
in writing can only be given by an instrument 
in writing. 
Section 1624 as amended Statute 1905 states: 
''The following contracts are invalid un-
less the same or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the 
party to be charged or his agent. 
( 4) An agreement for the sale of goods, 
chattels, or things in action at . a price not less 
than $200.00. 
Seymour v. Oelrichs, 106 P. 88 is the leading 
California case on this point, holding that an agent's 
authority to enter into a contract that is required 
by law to be in writing also must be in writing. 
This ca.se also holds that proof that an agent had 
authority to bind his principal by son1e sort of a 
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"\Yritten contract does not, in the absence of proof of 
"~ritten authority, justify the inference that the· 'agent 
had authority to bind the princip·al by a contract re-
quired to be in "'Titip.g under the Statute of Frauds. 
In the present case there was no probative 
evidence of the agents authority shown whatsoever by 
the plaintiff, Moses, the only evidence being the 
statements of Paul McFarland on Pages 85 and 8'7 
as to the instructions he gave to Basolo. 
Another n1ore recent case applying this law of 
California on agency is the case of Georgia Peanttt 
Co. v. FaJJlO Products Company, 96 F. (2) 440 in 
which the court stated "In our opinion the provisions 
of the California Code Sections a.re subject to but one 
interpretatio~, that is, that every one exercising an 
authority to sell or buy, save the specifically exclud-
ed auctioneer, whether a broker or any other class 
of agent, must have written authority to enter into 
a contract required to be in writing.'' 
It is submitted that there is nothing in the record 
exhibiting that the sales1nan had any authority to 
sell anything to this plaintiff. The court interrogated 
l)aul ~'lcFarland at the end of the trial. Note the 
question of the court on the final page of the transcript: 
Q. The court: It appears clear to me 
that these agents have authority to sell the 
n1erchandise if the plant has it on hand. The 
HL'·ent calls and finds out. If he doesn't have it, 
() ' 
tht·~T :-;ay, '' Uet dovvn and make your apologies.'' 
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If they do have it on hand, they fill the bill. 
Is that about it." · 
A. Yes, that's about it. 
Q. The court: Yes, it seems to me it 
is clear. The only question now is what the 
legal effect of that is on these fellows that 
think they are buying the goods. (R. 110) 
Any intelligent· understanding of the above answer 
by Mr. McFarland requires the reader to recall the 
burden of the rest of his testimony that in all cases, 
he, Mr. McFarland, instructed the salesman to com-
. municate orders to him for confirationm. (R. 85, 87, 
108) In this case it is undisputed and clear that at 
the time of the formation of the alleged contract 
''the plant did not have the p·roduct on hand.'' 
Evidently the court was very concerned about the 
''fellows that think they are buying the goods.'' It 
is not uncommon for intending buyers to be .dis-
appointed in the unavailabiltiy of goods desired. 
But the court inquiry brought out the essential fact 
that where there is no supply the agent has no auth-
ority to sell. (R. 110) Here, there was no supply. 
Here there was no authority to sell. Here there is no 
contract. 
2. TI-IE DEFENDANT HAD A RIGHT TO 
ACCEPT OR REJECT ORDERS FROM ITS 
SALE·SMAN. THE ORDER SUBMITTED B\~ 
PLAINTIFF WAS REJECTED. A COUNTER-
OFFER TO SEND 1\{UTTON ''AS AVAILABLE'' 
WAS GIVEN IN ITS STEAD. 
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Plaintiff contends and the rourt found that jt 
receiYed 6635 pounds and that defendant failed in its 
contract to deliYPr 23,365 pounds of meat, for which it 
"~as entitled to enter the market, purchase same, and 
charge defendant with the difference between the 241/2 
cents and the n1arket. On April 28, 1948, when plaintiff 
entered the market and purchased, it paid 36 cents 
per pound, n1aking a claimed loss of $2,686.98, for 
'vhich it sued, and recovered judgment, against de-
fendant. Defendant takes the position that there was 
no contract betvveen the parties which was enforceable 
by law. 
In the first place it must be understood that the 
commodity attempted to be purchesed by plaintiff and 
\Yhich is the subject of this suit was virtually impossible 
to obtain in defendant's territory. The undertaking 
by defendant was that it would supply the mutton "as 
available." 
Defendant's salesman from San Francisco called 
plaintiff Thfoses by phone in Los Angeles on the 28th 
day of October, 1947, and took four orders for meat. 
(Exhibit 9) That there was but one contract het\\Teen 
Basolo, salesman for plaintiff, and Moses, is clear jn 
the record u.pon careful analpsis. (R. 20, 35, 38, 45, 
58) 
The first of the four orders was for 30,000 pounds 
of boneless mutton which defendant had accumulated 
and had on hand; it was in cold storage. (R. 78) 
Plaintiff Moses testified ''l-Ie (Basolo) offered the 
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sale of this carload of mutton, representing himself as 
being able to sell it to us, and describing it . . . We 
agreed to buy it.'' (R. 37) 
Paul McFarland, general manager of defendant, 
testified as to that order that Basolo telephoned hin1 
and said: 
''I have an order for the boneless mutton 
you have in the freezer . . . . You can ship it 
and Basolo ga.ve me a purchase order number, 
which we attached to our invoice .... That . 
merchandise was shipped immediately.'' (R. 88) 
The order number used was plaintiff's No. 7465. 
The invoice is Exhibit 1. Mr. Frank Lees, sales 
manager for defendant, testified that the car was 
loaded and shipped to plaintiff on October 29th. (R. 79) 
The car sent to plaintiff was accumulated "between 
the latter part of August and the end of October," 
(R. 78), and represented all of the stock of that 
product held by defendant, so testified Mr. Moses. 
(R. 45) This shipment was received and paid for, 
and is not the subject of this suit. 
Contemporaneously with the giving of the above 
order (R. 45, 38), there vvas an order placed for an 
additional 30, 000 pounds, and it ·is as to this latter 
order that the present controversy arises. The perti-
nent testimony from McFarland is as follows: 
Q. Now what else was said~ (after g1v1ng 
the first order) 
A. Basolo said that Rancho Pack would 
also take another thirty thousand pounds of 
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mutton if "~e could get it, and I immediately 
told him it '"asn 't available. \~V e said we didn't 
have another thirty thousand pounds of mutton, 
'Ye probably couldn't get it, but that we would 
ship on an open order all the boneless mutton 
"?e could get through. ( R. 88) 
:Jir. ~Ioses had another version of the second 
order for boneless mutton, testifying: 
Q. I 'vant you to state the conversation 
you had with 1\ilr. Basolo with respect to the 
second ca1-load of meat. 
A. He said that ''you have bought our 
sup.ply, but 've do have these -coming up. We 
are going to have them coming right along 
every week. (sheep) We are in no position 
to accumulate a shipment of twenty-five or 
thirty thousand pounds, but we will have them 
coming in each week. Now, 'vould you be 
satisfied to receive five thousand pounds per 
week~ I said, ''yes, in fact you can send as 
little as three thousand but no less than that." 
He said on that basis I will contract with you 
to meet that operation. We have a truck coin-
ing in each week and will drop off three to 
five thousand pounds each week," and I in-
sisted on conveying to him that if he failed 
to do so that he would be putting us on a spot 
because we had possibilities at that time of 
buying mutton at that price. (R. 46) They 
will guarantee to deliver three to five thousand 
pounds each week. (R. 47) 
Q. You didn't have any statement from 
Mr. Basolo with respect to his arrangement 
with McFarland in California~ 
A. No. 
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Q. He sim:ply told you that ''you have 
already bought our present supply~'' 
A. That is right. (R. 46) 
As to the documentary evidence involved the 
following are pertinent: Plaintiff Moses testified that 
he had seen the four house orders comprising Exhibit 
9, (R. 69), the first one of which is defendant's record 
of the first order for boneless mutton at 25 cents per 
pound. The ~econd page of the document is for other 
meat, The third page of the document is for 5000 
pounds of pigs feet at 9 cents per pound. The fourth 
page is for the merchandise which is the subject of 
this suit, 30,000 additional .pounds of boneless mutton 
at 24¥2 eents. 
It is to be noted that all four "house orders" in 
Exhibit 9 bear the same date. October 28, 1947, showing 
that all business was done during the same day. The 
exhibit came from plaintiff's .San Francisco offi~e. 
(R. 107) 
An examination of the fourth page of Exhibit 9, 
which has been m·arked also as Exhibit I, (R. 71), 
discloses that there is a statement as to "When ship". 
It was ship "as available". At the trial, plaintiff was 
glad to have the exhibit available from defendant be-
cause of the language appearing thereon as follows: 
''Ship each week in lots of no less then 
3000 lbs. 
More if available." 
The import of the Exhibit 1 of course cannot be 
minimized, as it represents the transaction according 
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to the reeords of the San Francisco office of dR-
fendant. (R. ~)~, 107) Plaintiff testified that he had 
received copies of the said records also.. (R. 69) He 
therefore had actual knowledge that in the internal 
handling of the iten1, it wa.s being treated, as to 
delivery date, as an ''as available'' transaction. 
Johnson v. Shook & Fletcher Supply 16 So. 
2d. 406. 
The final additional document evidencing the 
transaction in question is Exhibit ,., B '', a letter written 
on defendant's stationary to plaintiff and signed by 
Basolo. Note that the latter used the title "District 
Manager". This he vvas not. (R. 105) 
T\YO things are important in connection with 
Exhibit "B". The first relates to the authority of 
Basolo. This subject is hereinbefore dealt with at 
length. It is clearly there demonstrated that Basolo 
was but an ordinary traveling salesman., with 
authority only to ''take orders and sell merchandise 
after he received confirmation from the packing house 
as to the availability and the price". (R. 86) 
Acceptance and confirmation of orders from salesman 
was required because at the time in question there 
was an insufficient supply of product to satisfy the 
demand. (R .87) Confirmation was the busineRs 
custom. Plaintiff Moses knew when he ordered the 
Recond 30,000 pounds of boneless mutton that there 
was no supply. He was told by the salesman that 
plaintiff "had bought our supply." (R. 45, 46) 
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The second important aspect of Exhibit '' B '' is 
that it states not that the defendant had confirmed the 
order, but simply that "We have advised the plant 
that lots of less than 3000 lbs. are not desirable be-
cause of your .production schedule''. In other words, 
there is nothing here to announce to plaintiff that the 
plant, has agreed to the shipment of not less than 3000 
pounds per week. It is a V·olunteer statement from 
a salesman to his patron ahead of confirmation by 
his employer as to what might be desirable. Basolo 
assumed to make the confirmation, and did so with-
out authority. He did not have authority to write the 
letter or confirm the shipment. His instructi'ons were 
positively to the contrary. (R. 88) 
At no time during the conversation between Basolo 
and Moses did Basolo represent that he had autho-
rity from McFarland to commit for the second ship-
ment, so stated Mr. Moses. In fact, Mr. Mos~s testi-
fied to the contrary: 
Q. You didn't have any statement from 
Mr. Basolo with respect to his arrangement 
A. No. 
Qo Mr. Basolo didn't tell you that he had 
conferred with Mr. McFarland did he~ There 
was nothing said about that was ther.e~ 
A. Well, there was nothing said about 
it, but it certainly was · assumed that he had. 
(R. 47) 
The salesman assumed to confirm the order by his 
letter of October 9. But if he did not have authority 
. . 
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to confirm, the letter is a nulity. The salesman's 
statement that '~,Ye \Yill ship" is worth nothing unless 
the salesman had actual or apparent authority. He 
had neither. 
Johnson v. Shook & Fletcher Supply 16 So. 
2d. 406. 
But even if it be assumed, that he did have some 
authority, the in1port of Exhibit· 9; page 4, is not 
disposed of, but clearly shows that the office of tlie 
defendant at San Francisco treated in the main the 
transaction as an ''as available'' deal. It was treated 
in the same light by the plant, and should be so treat-
ed by this court. 
The parties were dealing, and knew they were, 
for a commodity not then in existence. Moses knew 
that he had purchased all of the existing supply of 
boneless mutton. (R. 45) Moses further knew that 
certain areas of production of boneless mutton would 
''dry up" and that "it isn't an all-year proposition 
in anv one sectjon." It comes for a time and then 
•' 
stops. (R. 41, 77) 
It was said in Lester v. Superior Motor Car, 117 
Fed 2d 780 that: 
''. . . .where the purchaser has equal and 
available means for information and no fraud 
or artifice was used to prevent inquiry or in-
vestigation, there is a basis for the ap.plication 
of the rule of caveat emptor." 
See also Sm,ith V. H ollingBworth, 96 So~ 394 
"If the relation of principal and agent did 
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not exist but they were merely traders dealing 
with each other as such and, . . .at arms length, 
there would exist no grounds for the com-
plainant's suit. For neither law nor equity re-
lieves against one's own credulousness and in-
excusable indifference to one's own interest in 
a transaction where one has no legal right to 
rely upon the statements, representations, and 
descriptions of another· in the negotiations." 
Anheuser Bush v. Grovier Starr, 128 F. 2d. 
146 . 
During this critical time of supply, defendant did 
not ship the contested product to any other buyer 
than plaintiff. There was none available. (R. 103) 
It was only natural that the salesman in writing up the 
house order on the transaction stated in that import-
ant shipping instruction, to ship "as available". Those 
had been his instructions. · (R. 88) It is clear from 
the added langu~ge that plaintiff's order number 7001 
called for the shipment of no less than 3000 pounds. 
This was clearly what plaintiff desired. But the order 
as communicated to the plant was, according to the 
shipping instructions, an ''as available'' transaction. 
Mr. Basolo had been instructed specifically that there 
was no product available. (R. 88) Plaintiff's 1\ft. 
Moses knew this to be a fact. ( R. 45) Any atteinpt to 
wheedle out of a mere salesman a firm committment 
in such a state of supply, and in the face of positive 
knowledge that the salesman had no instructions from 
the plant as to the deal, is of itself not only ridiculous 
on its face, but a patent failure to effect a binding 
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eontraet. ''Tith the .product unavailable, the plaintiff 
and sales1nan kno\\'ing it was unavailable; with the 
salesman not getting a confirmation from the plant; 
\Yith specific instructions from the general manager 
to the salesman that he should not contract except 
on an open order basis; with the salesman making his 
O\Yn record on on '"as available'' basis and the plaintiff 
haYing notice thereof; and "vith him assuming to write 
an unauthorized letter of confirmation to the buyer, 
\\-herein he sho·w's that he has not communicated with 
the plant, sin1ply observing that he has "advised the 
plant, that lots of less than 3000 pounds are not desira-
ble", the transaction cannot be twisted into ~a fir1n 
promise to deliver 30,000 pounds of mutton on any sche-
dule. 
Everything about the transaction, except the verbal 
testimony of :l\1:oses, points to shipments on a condition, 
a condition precedent. The product would only be sent 
if it was available. As long a.s the condition was not 
met there could be no contract. . The following de-
fination of a condition precedent has the support of 
rnany authorities: 
''a condition precedent is one that is to be 
performed before the agreement becomes effec-
tive and which calls for the happening of som.e 
event or the performance of some act after the 
terms of the contract have been agreed upon, 
before the contract shall be binding on the 
parties.'' Atl. Pac .. Oil v. Gas Development Co. 
69 p 2d 755 
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''A condition p,recedent is one which must 
be performed before the agreement of the part-
ies becomes a valid and binding contract. 
Whether a condition is precedent depends up-
on the intent of the parties, and this is to be 
gathered from the context.'' Mcisaac v. Hale, 
132 A. 916, 1926 
In this case, the condition was to ship ''as a vail-
able". Shipments were made on that basis. Defendant 
shipped boneless mutton to no other person during the 
time in question than plaintiff. (R. 103) But on the 
other hand, the reservation in the engagement of this 
condition prevented any mutually binding contract from 
coming into existence. The defendant was not bound , 
to make shipments if the product was unavailable. 
''as the plaintiff was not bound to make 
deliveries under the contract therefore, it vvas 
void for lack of mutuality in so far as it pro-
vided for future sale or purchase. 'I'he law is 
well settled that where a contract for the future 
delivery of personal property confers upon 
either party an arbitrary right of cancella-
tion prior to delivery, it is lacking in mutual-
ity and will be held binding ·upon the parties 
only to the extent that it has been performed. 
And, with respect to distributors contracts, 
.... It is equally well settled that such 
a contract which does not bind the manufactur-
er to sell and deliver, and which is terminable 
at will, imposes no liability upon him if he 
terminates it or refuses to make deliveries to 
the dealer. Motor ·Car Supply vs. General 
I-Iousehold Utilities Co. 80 F2 167. 
Also see Jordon v. Buick Motor Co. 75 F2 
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Cosby Hodges Milling Co. v. Riley 149 So. 
612 
.. A_n • j, as available'' transaction does not bind 
the shipper and any engagement to ship based on such 
an illusory pron1ise, could not be binding on either 
party. California Ref. vs. Producers Refini?g Co. 76 
Pac. 2d, 553, 25 Cal. Apl. 2, 104 
The word ''available'' as defined by W ebsters 
N e"~ International Dictionary 2nd edition, means: ''At 
disposal, accessable, or attainable, a.s tickets, avail-
able on that day. Synonym: ready, handy, con-
venient, usua.ble, obtainable." The word available in 
a coal case involving suit for failure to pay royalties 
for failure to \York a mine, was treated as follows: 
''What is available and merchantable coal'? 
lTnder the terms of the lease fairly and reason-
ably construed, available coal includes coal re-
coverable as practical and reasonable mining 
proposition, considering actual conditions cost, 
and all the surrounding circumstances''. Big 
,.,.. ein Pocahontas v. Browning 120 So. E. 247, 
252 
Immediately after the order was given, it was 
communicated to the defendant who rejected it as 
given. (R. 88) A counter offer was made by the 
general manager. The counter offer was communicat-
ed to the salesman, and was reflected in the house 
order, Exhibit 9, page 4, marked Exhibit 1. · This 
counter offer was to the effect that mutton would be 
shipped only as available. It is submitted that any 
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agreement bottomed on the proposition that the 
offeree shall perform only as a commodity is available, 
is lacking in mutuality and consideration. There was 
what may be called a "qualified" acceptance of the 
offer as made by the plaintiff, or there was a counter 
offer; in either event the ''as available" fact of the 
situation was a new ingredient. 1, Williston on 
Contract, Rev. Ed, 144 As long as there was such un-
certainly in the performance of ~he contract as the 
obligation to deliver only if available, there could be 
no binding contract for future performance. And. so 
it is said the alleged contract was void for want of 
mutuality. Mutuality only comes into the case because 
the court below found that a contract resulted, and 
that partial shipments were made pursuant to that 
contract. 
In ·a California case where ·parties thought they 
were contracting for the refining of oil, the court 
pointed out that while the refinery agreed to process 
a certain amount of product per day, yet the producer 
-vvas not required to rnake available to the refinery any 
crude oil, and hence there "\Vas no contract for lack 
of 1nutuality. 
"It is uniform-ally held that a , contract 
which reserves in either party an option to 
deliver or to accept personal property, or 
which contracts for future delivery of personal 
property, the quantity of which delivery is 
dependent upon the will, wish, or desire of the 
other party, is void for lack or consideration 
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and mutuality." California Ref. Co. v. Pro-
ducers Refining Corp. 76 P2 553, 25 Cal. Apl. 2d, 
. 104. 
Defendant shipped on an open order basis, the 
follo,ving boneless mutton to .plaintiff. Note that not 
a single ship1nent corresponds to what the plaintiff 
claims he had a firm promise to receive: 
Date Shipped Quantity Shipped Price Exhibit No. 
Pounds 
November 11, 1947 ________ 2,851. 24% 2 
November 15, 1947 ________ 1,084 24% 3 
November 22, 194 7 ________ 1,200 24% 4 
November 29, 1947 ________ 400 24% 5 
December 6, 194 7 __________ 664 24%· 6 
January 31, 1948 __________ 332 25 7 
~ ote that there is a major deviation In the 
amount of the shipment on the contested order with 
all but the first, and as to that, there is a shortage of 
one hundred fifty pounds. Note that as to three of the 
six shipments, that the price was not that claimed to 
have been agreed upon. If there was a contract, why 
did plaintiff pay the added rate per pound, and accept 
the short shipments~ The record discloses that ~plain­
tiff paid his bill regularly and without protest. (R. 89) 
An examination of Exhibit 8, which is the ledger of 
defendant, discloses the date when all charges were 
made on the above items, and when they were paid. 
The merchandise "\Vas paid for on the basis of the 
billing. 
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Defendant never treated the transaction at any 
time as one binding on it. Paul McFarland testified 
that it was always his understanding that he was to 
ship on an "open order (R. 88, 96), "as available." 
What would have been the status if the evidence 
was that McFarland agreed: ''I will send you the 
mutton in installments if I can find it"~ If Mr. 
Moses made a contract with an automobile dealer 
to deliver a certain make of car ''if he could get 
one", he would have little chance of prevailing in a 
suit for damages. The contract would he void for 
want of mutuality. If the car was produced and de-
livered within a reasonable time, a unilateral con-
tract would have resulted; but ahead of the finding 
and delivery of- the car, there was no enforceable 
contract. In this case, the undelivered meat was 
never available, and there could never be a contract 
e~cept for the price if the commodity were actually 
delivered. 
In this record, it cannot be doubted that the de-
fendant intended at the time to have delivery cond~­
tional. So far as defendant was concerned it has to 
, be on that basis. It would have been insanity for it 
to contra.ct otherwise. For plaintiff to attempt to 
make such a contract with a mere salesman, with no 
checking with the plant, was folly. Knowing there 
vvas no supply, it could not rely on the representation 
of a mere salesman to make a firm committment. 
Plaintiff knew, or should have kno,vn, that the sale~-
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man \Ya.s being put out on a limb to undertake to bind 
the plant to an in1possible performance. There was 
never a n1eeting of the minds on a firm promise for 
a promise. There \Yas an order given and accepted 
on a condition precedent that there should be avail-
able a supply. The condition attached defeated the 
formation of a binding contract, and in its stead 
left the parties without a contract. 
The simple law of formation of contracts requires 
a meeting of the minds. Todorovich v. Kinnickinnic 
1\fut. Loan Assn. 135 A.L.R. 818, 298 NW 226 238 Wis. 39. 
That court said : 
"To constitute an acceptance and the 
creation of ·a contract there must be a meeting 
of the minds upon all essential terms there-
of. \\There an ·acceptance varies from the offer 
in respect to such terms it amounts to a re-
jection of the offer and the submission of a 
counter proposal without forming a contract 
unless the party making /the offer renews it 
and agrees to the suggested modifications.'' 
Here there was an offer in the form of plaintiff's 
purchase order, (Exhibit "A"), or better, the con-
versation with Basolo. This offer was never accepted 
by one with authority; and the evidence from the San 
Francisco office in the form of the house orders, 
(Exhibit 9), communicated at the time to both plain-
tiff and defendant by the salesman, sho"\\7ed that he 
treated the order not as a firm committment. Certain-
ly in the first stages of the transaction there W'as no 
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semblence of an authorized acceptance of the offer. 
Everything points to the existence of a condition being 
attached to the transaction. Thus we have a counter 
offer stating a condition. There is nothing in the 
record which shows acceptance by plaintiff of the 
condition, which proves there could be no -contract. 
And even if ,plaintiff did accept the condition, it 
would still lack mutuality and consideration and would 
not qualify as a binding contract. In truth and in fact, 
the minds of the litigants never met in establishing 
a firm committment to deliver personal property 
virtually impossible of abtaining. Ajax Holding Co. 
v. Heinsbergen 149 P2 189 
Defendant agreed to deliver plaintiff mutton as 
available, and this he faithfully did. To construct over 
the heads of the :parties , a bi-lateral contract is un-
fair and not reflective of the true intents of the 
parties, and the practices of the packing industry. 
The court committed error In finding a contract 
existed and assessing damages for breach therP0f. The 
lo \!Ver court should be reversed. 
3. :SHIPMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT 
TO PLAINTIFF DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
AC·CEPTANCE OF ANY CONTRACT. 
The trial court entered findings that the contract 
came into being in the telephone conversation. (R. 6) 
We have undertaken hereinbefore to prove the court 
was in error. I:Iovv-ever, it might be argul•d that ~as a 
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consequence of the shipments of the mutton, there was 
an acceptance of an offer. ''T e here dispute that any 
shipment made by defendant constituted an ·acceptance 
of any outstanding offer, or resulted in any oblgation 
of rontract other than for pl·aintiff to pay the price for 
the goods accepted. 
It n1ay be ·argued that by defendant shi:pping under 
the original offer, it became bound to ship all of the 
30,000 pounds ordered. In the first place, .what evidence 
is there in the record that defendant at the time knevv 
there was a firm offer for 30,000 p·ounds ~ There is no 
evidence that McFar~and received a copy of plaintiff's 
order number 7001, Exhibit ''A''. However, defendant 
received Exhibit I, which is page 4 of Exhibit 9. 
We can be sure that Basolo phoned McFarland and 
told him of the two orders, the first of which was ac-
cepted ·and shipped immediately. The second ·Order '\\7as 
declined except on the basis of an open order. (R. 88) 
Plaintiff may argue that by shipping 2851 pounds as in 
Exhibj t 2 there \vas an acceptance of the whole order. 
It vvonld take ·a. tortured interpretation of the facts for 
the rourt to g.o along with the view when under the 
circumstances, the supply \Vas so much in doubt. I-T ad 
there been no question of supply, it might be argued 
that acceptance was presumed by shipping the first 
installment. But enough has been s·aid to sho'\\r that 
plaintiff was on notice of the impossibility of. full per-
formance, and hence no im:plication of an intention to 
do a vrtually impossible thing should be entertained. 
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Almost the same precise f~aets accompany the order 
for 5000 pounds of pigs feet given at the same time. 
(Exhibit 9, page 3) ·The plaintiff Moses testified that 
he ordered that quantity of pigs feet from Basolo, but 
that it was no "contract." (R. 62) It w·as an "order" 
he said. How is it not also a contract if the mutton was 
a contract~ The defendant shipped pigs feet on the 
5000 pound order as follows: 
Date Shvp1ped Quantity Price Exhibit No. 
N ovemher 15, 1947 __________ 627lbs. 9c 3 
November 22, 1947 __________ 728lbs. lOc 4 
November 29, 194 7 __________ 314lbs. 15c - 5 
December 6, 1947 ____________ 129lbs. 10c 6 
If the court below took the position that it was the 
conduct of the plant in actually shipping on the first 
installment of the order that brought the contract for 
mutton into being, then there should also be found 'a 
contract existed for the shipment of pigs feet. There 
was a shipment, and in the first instance, it "ras at the 
price offered. Why didn't plaintiff enter suit for pigs 
feet not shipped and for a refund for over charging~ 
Under the thinking of plraintiff, and the trial court in 
the mutton facts, there was a contract for pigs feet! 
Yet plaintiff said there was no contract, there was 
simply an "order". Why and where is the difference~ 
The pigs feet trans·action illustrates the real method 
of business followed by not only the litigants, but by 
the packing industry. The packing house is dependent 
on the sup1ply· from the farms; and packing houses do 
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not blindly guarantee delivery. They ship what they can 
in the absence of strict agreement. Plaintiff ordered 
5000 pounds of pigs feet and g·ot 1798 pounds. He didn't 
mind the difference in price either. Plaintiff ordered 
30,000 pounds of boneless mutton in the first deal and 
got 27,700: in the second transaction, he ordered 30,000 
lbs. and got 6,635 and he didn't mind the change in the 
price. In no case did plain tiff bother with ~>'rocurring a 
firm committment at the outs-et. There cannot be impliea 
an acceptance of a contract to ship 30,000 pounds of mut-
ton without also implying the same for the pigs feet, and 
the court cannot imply a contract for the pigs feet be-
cause ~[r. Moses specifically said there was not such. 
(R. 62) 
The only way to treat the transactions is as a 
''divisible offer requesting a series of acts to be given 
from tin1e to time. If an offer is of this divisible char-
acter, it may be revoked not only before ·any acceptance 
but also as to any portion of the offer still unaccepted 
even after acceptance of some of the se~ies of ·transac-
tionR .proposed by the offer" says Mr. Williston ·a:t 
page 163 of Volume 1 of his revised edition on con-
tracts. 
The honorable trial judge made a conscientious 
effort to arrive at the true practice of the defendant 
and thP industry. The crux of the ca.se is probably 
contained in the last three pages of the record. Mr. 
lVIcFarland t.estified in response to a question from the 
court concerning vvhat he had tol~ the salesman as fol-
lows: 
''. . . the salesmen including B•a.solo ''are to · 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 
go out and try to find a market for our mer-
chandise and never to oversell our production. 
Now, salesmen can go out and offer this mer-
chandise, and if the buyer accepts the salesman's 
offer, he comes back to the plant for confirma-
tion.'' 
Q. By the court: And you always confirm 
it if you have got it on hand~ 
A. We confirm it by either filling the order 
or rejecting it. 
Q. By the court: If you have it on hand, do 
you ever reject~ . 
A. Well, if there is orders ·ahead of it, we 
probably would reject it. First orders come first. 
It is handled the same throughout the country. 
(R. 108). 
It is clear that Mr. MaFarland is testifying that 
he insists on confirmation of all orders; that t~e sales-
man must communicate the order to him, and that he 
confirms it ''by either filling the order or rejecting it.'' 
In other words, he insists that his act of filling the 
order, on the one hand, constitutes a confirmation of 
which he alone has the jurisdiction. On the other hand, 
if he fails to Bhip. he may thus reject the proferred 
order. In neither case d·oes he necessarily communicate 
any words to the intending :purchaser. I-Ie ships, or he 
fails to ship. 
Now the question is, and it '\\ras raised by the 
court at page 109, what are the rights of the intending 
purchaser during the interim~ ' 'Do you just keep him 
dangling by the hook until you decide whether or not 
you are going to fill his order~" To which Mr. Mc-
Farland answered: 
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• ~\\;ell, usually t'Yo or three days later or 
'Yithin a reasonable time if the salesman finds 
out the order isn't filled, he will go back and 
try to apologize, as is being done most of the 
tiine. '' (Due to shortage of product.) 
This Ineans that McFarland treats the order as 
aYailable to him to accept or reject after it has been 
conununicated to him by the salesman; that the act of 
acceptance or '' confirn1ation'' may consist of simply 
shipping the merchandise, or that the act of refusal 
may consist of a failure to ship the merchandise, in 
'Yhich case, the salesman might or might not return 
to the customer and state he was sorry but the order 
was rejected. Is it an improper procedure~ Does this · 
handling of orders violate the law of contracts~ Had 
the intending purchaser been unfairly dealt with~ The· 
answer is no. 1 v\Tilliston on Contracts, Rev. Ed. 193. 
It is cle.ar from pages 109 and 110 of the rec('~d 
that the honorable trial judge made his decision, la·IJer 
reflected in the findings, (R. 6), that the salesman in 
such a situation, had the authority to make ;a present · 
sale; that the sale was and is consummated by the 
salesman even before the offer is communicated to 
the plant; that the plant has no right or power to 
confirm, accept or reject, but that it is committed by 
the salesman to supply the subject of the order as 
agreed by the salesman; that otherwise the purchaser 
\Yill be left dangling.'' 
This is the only way to ex:plain the findings and 
deei ~ion of the trial court in this case. He found in 
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effect that Basolo had absolute authority, and that all 
of defendant's many salesmen acting similarly to 
Basolo had authority to commit the plant without con-
firmation. This interpretation brings a flood of law 
suits to the packing house business! (R. 109). 
The evidence in the last portion of the record 
shows that the court was impressed with what it felt 
was an apparent injustice to the intending purchaser; 
that the court did not intend to leave him "dangling 
.on the hook." It is clear that the trial court did not 
agree that McFarland should have the option when it· 
received information about the offer from the intend-
ing purchaser to accept or reject, nor that the accept-
ance could be in the simple form of a shipment of 
the goods, and a refusal to accept by a failure to ship. 
What is the law of facts~ 
Does not the hat salesman from the New York 
hat factory come to the Salt Lake haberdashery and 
take an order for ten hats ·and communicate it to the 
factory~ It takes 3 days for the order to be sent to 
the factory, and a day to get to the man who must 
coordinate production of the plant with distribution. 
Does the plant man have an option to say to himself, 
or to his organization alone, "yes, we will ship the 
ten hats'', or ''no, we do not have the hats, .we will 
ignore the order~'' Certainly the haberdasher must 
wait a reasonable time. The cases hold that that sale~­
man, in the absence of specific authority, does not 
make a contract. The Salt Laker has made an offe:·. 
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If the hats are shippPd within a reasonable time, the 
act of shipn1ent constitutes an acceptance, and an exe-
cuted unilateral contract results. If the manufacturer 
does not ship ".,.ithin a reasonable time, (and no com-
nlunication of acceptance is required),_ the offer auto-
rna tic ally dies. Is it of any consequence to the lia-
bility situation that the salesman returns and says: 
'~ iliy company can't handle your business~'' The 
ans,Yer 1s no. 
Unilateral contracts come into existence not by 
agreements, but by the act of an offeree in response 
to the offer of the offeror. No words need he said 
by the actor. Henderson v. Barber, 85 So. 35; 1 Willis 
-ton on Contracts, Rev. Ed. 193. The words all come 
from the person to whom the action is directed. Had 
the company written ''We accept the order and will 
ship'' a bilateral contract would result. Had Basolo 
been told by nfcFarland that the offer W1as accepted 
and Basolo had communicated it, there would have 
been a binding bilateral contract. From ,all that ap-
pPars in the record, Moses did not inquire further 
after the phone conversation with Basolo on October 
28th, as to the acceptance of the plant, ( R. 45), so 
that on this ,point no binding bilateral contract could 
come into existence. 
Clearly Basolo had no power to make a contract. 
McFarland did not accept the offer as made, but 
made a counter-offer, part at least of which was com-
municated to Moses for M·oses admitted he had re-
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ceived the house order Exhibit 9 which stated among 
other things delivery "as available". ( R. 69). The 
shipments were made by the plant on the basis of 
the counteroffer. Every shipment made was less than 
the 3000 pounds minimum in the rejected offer. (Ex-
hibits 1 to 7). In behalf of the shipments the price 
w1as higher. The shipments amounted to a series of 
unilateral contracts. 
It is clear the defendant never intended to bind 
itself to minimum shipments. The only evidence there-
of are the words of the agent testified to by Moses, 
who vvas biased. Everything in the collateral f,act 
situation compels the conclusion that the business was 
intended at the time as an "as available" transaction. 
As such, the offer must be looked at. as a divisible 
offer requesting a series of acts, the shipment of the 
first, not constituting an accept,a.nce of the whole. 
W il'liston says it is possible to make such divisible 
offer, as follows: 
''If an offer is of this divisible character it 
may be revoked not only before any acceptance, 
but also as to any portion of the offer still 
unaccepted even after acceptance of s-ome of 
the series of transactions proposed by the offer. 
1 ~williston on Contracts, Revised Ed. 163. 
In the example of the hat salesman, if the offer 
was for ten hats each month for 6 months, the sales-
man clearly not having authority to make such a con-
tract, and the company started to fill the orders by 
sending the first full o1·der, would it not follow, from 
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the authority quoted fron1 Williston, that the offer 
\Yas divisible and could be vvithdrawn, or rejected by 
either party as to the future installments not yet 
areepted ·? 
• ,~V"illiston takes the other side of the problem for 
analysis as to the power of the offeror to revoke 
mid-\Yay in a series of acts, or one act taking some 
time to perform. He states that the courts, in order 
to avoid the hardship resulting from a revocation mid-
way in performance, will interpret the contract as 
being bilateral. But he seems to say that where the 
situation is clearly unilateral involving a long extended 
perfor1nance the offeree having begun performance, 
that still the offeror may withdraw the offer since 
the whole transaction is still optional with the offeref~. 
1 Williston, Rev. Ed .. 165. 
The Restatement of contracts states that: 
''A revocable offer contemplating a series 
of independent contracts by separate acceptances 
may be effectively revoked so as to terminate 
the power to create future contracts, though 
one or more of the proposed contracts have 
already been formed by the offeree's acceptance." 
1 Restatement of Contracts, 52. 
In this case, the lack of product -forces the con-
clusion that a series of independent contracts for 
separate acceptances was contemplated. 
l~ ote the con1ments in the Restatement s-ection 
above quoted: 
a. An offer may propose several contracts to 
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1a.rise at separate times. Such an offer is 
divisible, and the power to make an effec-
tive revocation continues pari passu with 
the continuing power to accept. 
b. Where an offer contemplates a ~series of 
unilateral contrf;tcts, beginning performance 
of the consideration for any one of the 
series makes the offer for that one irre-
vocable. 
It is here submitted that the trial court was wrong 
In inferring in the final pages of the transcript that 
the plaintiff in this case should not be left dangling; 
:and t·hat rather than achiev~ that result, it should 
be found that there was a contract fro1n the time of 
the telephone conversation. It is submitted that the 
record shows that the court was influenced by what 
the defendant did after it got the offer, than it was 
by the actual or apparent authority of Basolo at the 
time. The findings are not a true reflection of the facts. 
What the defendant did after it received the offer 
as communicated by Basolo is the important part of 
this case, and obviously involves serious legal problems. 
Clearly the offer as subrnitted was not accepted. A 
counteroffer was given for communication to plaintiff. 
Shipments began on the basis of the counteroffer. No 
·Shipments needed to be made if the manager did not 
wish to accept. This was obviously interpreted by the 
trial court as keeping the plaintiff dangling. It is 
submitted that such considerations should not havr 
been the basis of the decision of the court as reflected 
in the transcript and in the findings. 
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The fact is that ship1nents beg'an under an "as 
aYailable '' progra1n. Clear deviations from the in-
tending purchaser's rejected offer, characterized the 
ship1nents from the start. The plaintiff would now 
say he 'vaived the defect in acceptance, and that there 
has been "a contract made because he is willing to 
disreg'ard the defect in the acceptance'' without coln-
munication 'vith the offeree. 1\Ir. V\Tilliston says to 
allo"'" such is to violate a vital law of contracts. 
"Nothing is more fundamental than that in 
bilateral contracts both parties must be bound, 
or neither; and that in unilateral contracts the 
performance requested must be simultaneous 
with the creation of any obligation on the part 
of the promisor. To allow ·a waiver of a defect 
of an acceptance is virtually to say that the 
acceptance is binding on the acceptor, or may 
be treated as binding by the offeror (wh1ch 
amounts to the same thing) from the time when 
it is made though the offeror himself is still 
perfectly free to assert that the acce:ptance was 
defective, and though no estoppel forbids the 
acceptor from showing the true facts. In truth, 
a defective acceptance can only ~amount to d 
counteroffer, and the only way a contract can 
be formed is by acceptance of the counteroffer 
in the same way as if it were an original offer. 
1 Williston on Contracts, Revised Ed. 292. 
Shipments made by defendant to plaintiff did not 
constitute any acceptance of any contract. No contract 
existed before shipment. Shipments made were on the 
basis of a counteroffer made by defendant that it 
,,·ould ship the scare produet "as available". The 
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only binding con tract ere a ted by the transaction was 
for plaintiff to pay for what he got, and this he did. 
To allow plaintiff to recover for the balance of mutton 
not shipped is wrong, unjust, and against the com-
merce and trade of a great established industry which 
for years has done business under a differ~nt under-
standing of contract. 
Note now what Moses says about choosing the time 
for mitigating his damages: 
''We had been given assurance right ·on down 
the line that this mutton would be forthcoming. 
We had a reserve of mutton on hand all the 
time. We had assurance that as soon as the run 
came or whatever condition came about that they 
would fulfil their obligation, and ·only when it 
was at that time indica ted to us that there was 
no intention of fulfilling this thing were · we 
forced to then buy mutton, because aboct that 
time we were dangerously low in our supplies.'' 
(R. 72) 
When was it that defendant "indicated to us that 
there vvas no intention of fulfilling this thing"~ JYir 
Farland had only one phone conversation vvith 1foses 
-that on January 9th. (R. 90) He wrote only one letter, 
January 15th. (Exhibit "D ") Other letters "rere writ-
ten, but not until long after the alleged purchase April 
28th in mitigation. The plaintiff testified that there was 
a time indicated when the order would not be filled. 
That time was at the latest January 9th, or 15th. That 
was the time to mitigate the damages, not 4 months later. 
The price of mutton on the ·Chicago market during the 
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first \Yeek of January was 291;2 cents. The price when 
plaintiff sa"? fit to mitigate \Yas 36 cents. We submit 
this is quite a. spread, and plaintiff knew all the time 
the price \Yas rising. (R. 33, 58) Bona fide~ No. It was 
a studied attempt from the time of the January phone 
call to torture a decent ordinary transaction into a hurt-
ful one~ contrary to the understandings of the parties 
\ 
and to the trade. Son1eone decided in January to take 
advantage of the g·ood intention of Mr. McFarland, as 
stated in his innocent letter of January 15th. Why did 
Mr. McFarland send 332 pounds to plaintiff on J anu:a.ry 
31 at 25 cents, if he kne"\v he "\vas stuck with a big con-
tract for 24;·1· and why did Moses pay the bill for the 
overage~ 
This was not mitigation. It was plotting. It was 
taking advantage o£ a rising m'arket. Plaintiff had the 
burden of proof that he did mitigate, that he used 
reasonable effort. It would have been easy for plaintiff 
to have bought lower than 34 cents, but he came into 
·conrt having failed, yet asked and received from the 
trial court, judgment based on a failure to follow good 
conscience and the statute. 
''r e come now to an aspect of the record where 
possibly the lack of good conscience is -a little more in 
evidence. Mr. l\foses testified that when he did not 
get the 3000 pounds expected in the second shipment 
(Nov. 15, exhibit 3) he made .purchases in the open 
market. (R. 51) He testified that he did what he could 
to keep his supply coming. (R. 31) "We made wha.t 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
52 
purchases we could in the open market". (R. 51) "We 
might have bought small amounts'' from others. (R. 63) 
Then when he testified about the large purchase on April 
28th, he testified: "This was a purchase - this was 
the first purchase of a quantity, sizeable quantity, since 
the time we had been dealing with McFarland' '. ( R. 31, 
63) 
Mr. Moses reluctantly testified that he "might have" 
bought quantities of the product from other shippers 
in both December and January. (R. 63) Was it not his 
duty to come into court and prove the ·amounts of these 
purchases~ Was there not a studdied attempt to con-
ceal them and thus take advantage of the rising market~ 
That w·as not quite the clean hands that might have been 
shown. Yet the court below wholly disregarded these 
. purchases. Ho\vever, the court itself was quite inter-
ested in asking about the reserves, regularly carried at 
about 150,000 pounds. At the "first part of 1948", 
Moses said they were down to as low ·as seventy thou-
sand pounds. (R. 73) He also testified that they were 
"dangero1isly low" at the time defendant refused to 
ship. This would mean, in terms of the time defendant 
actually refused, in January, that that was the time to 
buy,- not four months later when the market had ad-
vanced from 29lf2c to 34c. To this defendant, the dif-
ference amounts to $1285.00, and to the conscience of the 
sjtuation is important, to S'a~ the least. 
It is submitted that plaintiff has failed to comply 
with the law of mitigation, and that defendant has been 
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injured thereby, as ·a result of the error of the trial court 
in requiring plaintiff, as a condition of recovery, to dis-
close the true state of farts as to purchases m'ade. The 
very least this court should do is to remand, and re-
quire plaintiff to bring into court from C·alifornia his 
full rerords of purchases and disclose what boneless 
mutton purchases were made between November 8, 1947 
(Exhibit ~), "~hen the first shortage appeared, and 
April 28, 1948, \Yhen the alleged mitigation purchase 
was made. (Exhibit "H") 
·Carlon v. Renting, 70 S.E. 923; 154 N.C. 530. 
Denio Milling v. Malin, 165 P. 1113; 25 Wyo. 
143. 
Western Cooperate v. Colussi, 231 P. 1. 
4. DEFENDANT AT NO TIME RATIFIED 
THE ALLEGED CONTRACT MADE BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFF AND THE SALESMAN BASOLO. 
The findings of the court are to the effect that 
a binding contract was entered into between the liti-
gants at the time of a telephone conversation between 
the salesman Baso'lo and plaintiff on or about October 
28, 1947. (R. 6) T:hat was the testimony of the plain~ 
tiff. What the parties did after that telephone con-
versation is of no consequence according to the 
findings. 
Out of caution, defendant wishes to bring to the 
attention of the court the relevant facts subsequent to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the above conversation to prove that there could be 
no ratification. 
The Restatement of Agency, at page 197, defines 
Ratification as follows: 
''Ratification is the affirmance by a per-
son of a ~prior act which did not bind him 
but which was done or professedly done on his 
account, w,hereby the act, .as to some or all 
persons, is given effect as if originally authorized 
by him.'' 
It is elsewhere shown herein that defendant 
shipped certain quantities of boneless mutton, the 
quantities being shown on exhibits 2 to 8 inclusive. 
A schedule of such shipments appears on page 35 
of this brief. Such shipments did not nor could they 
constitute a ratification. 
AJll of the shipments were made by defendant 
under the belief that they were on an "·as available" 
basis. Defendant did not have a copy of the plain-
tiff's alleged purchase order. (R. 95) It did have 
the house order --which stated among ·other things t1ult 
the shipn1ent was to be as· av2'-ilable. (Exhibit 9, 
page 4) It did not know of the writing of exhibit "B" 
until 7 months later. (R. 95). It did not know that 
Basolo had not communicated its refusal to accept the 
offer as orginially made. McFarland shipped on an 
"open order." (R. 89, 101) Shipments were at "no 
set priee. '' ( R. 101) The billings were 3 orders for 
24~~ cents (Exhibits 2-r :3, 4), :2 orders for 24 3/4 centR 
(Exhibits 5 and 6), and the fina11 order for 25 cent~ 
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(Exhibit 7). Plaintiff aeeepted the shipments and 
paid for then1. 
R.atifi~a tion of the original offer, if accepted by . 
Basolo, is not offirmed by the above acts. The above 
aets are foreign to the offer as made. They constitute 
ne'Y and additional ingredients. For ratification to 
take place on the telephone ·order, there would have 
to be shipments of 3000 pounds and billings at 24¥2 
cents weekly. ..AJl of the above acts were done in 
ignorance of any committment by the salesman, if any 
was made by him, concerning the deliveries. The 
authorities are unanimous in holding ''that there can 
be no ratification by acquiescence, silence or f·ailure 
to repudiate, un!less the principal has full and com-
plete knowlege of all the material facts attending the 
the unauthorized transaction." 2 Am. Jur. 190. 
The Utah Supreme Court has said: 
"It is also well recognized that in orrler 
that a ratification of an unauthorized act or 
transaction of an agent or of another may be 
valid and binding, it is essential that the 
principal or the person making the ratification 
bad a fu1l knowledge at the time of the ratifi-
cation of all material facts and circumstances 
relative to the unauthorized act or transaction; 
a1lso that an intention to ratify is essential and 
whieh must be shown either by an express or 
hy an implied ratification.'' 
Jones v. Mutual Creamery 17 P. 2d, 256, 259 
In order to have an acceptance by shipping, the 
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t(~l'Ins of the order must he complied with. D~eviations 
as to amount, terms, price, are fatal. 
Miller Bros. Hat Co. v. A. D. Smith 201 
NYS 47~6 
Senner & Kaplan v. Gera Mills 173 NYS 265 
Frick & Lindsay v. Johnson 115 At. 837 
We now come to the events occuring in January 
after all but the final shipment had been effected. It 
appears that on or a few days before January 9, 
1948, plaintiff telephoned defendant and discussed the 
order. Let it he recalled that boneless mutton was 
a seasonal item with defendant. 
Moses testified that he phoned to appeal for the 
product ordered, that he had ''made a deal for ship-
ments of not less than 3000 pounds and that our 
needs were 5000 pounds, and it was agreed that 5000 
pounds would be the attempted amount shipped." 
(R.~8) 
Me Farland reported to plaintiff that ''there was 
nothing available at the present time but he would do 
~all he could to get going on this to the best of his 
ability." (R. 28) Note plaintiff quotes the gener:1l 
manager pretty close to the latters theory of the trans-
action throughout. Me Farland says by phone he will 
get going to the "best of his ability". Then Moses 
writes the letter of J~anuary 9, (Exhibit "C ",) 
in which he outlines the terms of his offer to pur-
ehase :from the salesman, and asks defendant to stress 
a point toward the minimum shipment, stating that 
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his supplies are '' Yery acute''. Does this mean he 
was about out'? 
Plaintiff then wrote Exhibit "D", the letter of 
January 15, and therein stated he wou!ld do his ut-
most to complete the transaction. Which transaction 
may "~e ask! The transaction he had talked about 
with his salesman wherein he had told the latter that 
he would ship as available, but that no eommittment 
could be made as to minimums! (R.88) Order No. 
7001. Exhibit "A", was not before Me Farland when 
he wrote the letter. Only a memory of his conver-
sation with Basolo was in his mind. It cannt be doubted 
that in answering the letter, McFarland had in mind 
the ·open order basis, and that he had been doing the 
best he could, and would continue to. 
McFarland tald Moses at this time there was no 
more mutton available, ''The sheep had all gone to 
the winter desert. If we could find any additional 
sheep we would bone them out and ship them as they 
showed up on the market." (R. 91) It might be 
6 weeks before another shipment, but it was impos-
sible to make shipments. Moses told McFarland he 
had a contra~t. McFarland answered he did n·ot, 
that shipments were being made on an open order 
as available as fast as we could accumulate it." 
(R. 91) 
Neither the pleadings, nor the findings alllege 
or find that there was ratification, and none need 
be argued. H·ovvever, it will no doubt he suggested 
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by plaintiff. It is submitted that here, there is no 
evidence of ratification. The verbal testimony of 
· McFarland flatly repudiates acknowledgement of any 
contract. It is apparent that he is still doing his 
best to keep the business of this firm on the basis he 
agreed upon. l-Ie cannot find the product, Hnd Moses 
so testifi·ed that McFarland so stated on January 
9th. That McFarland wrote the letter, E·xhibit "D", 
still stating he would do his best is no ratification. 
l-Ie stated: ''it is almost impossible to obtain any 
mutton to bone". This is not the language of ra-
tification. It is the language of a gentleman trying 
to make good his promise that he would send all 
available. This he faithfully did, sending no product 
to any other customer. (R. 103) 
N.ote that he made one additional shipment, Ex-
hibit 7, after the phone call and letters, eonsisting 
of 332 pounds at 25 cents. Gan this he evidence of 
ratification~ Stil:l a deviation of quantity and price! 
But plaintiff accepted it . 
.-~he on}y other possible evidence of ratification 
consists of letters written after the date plaintiff 
claims he went into the market to "mitigate'' his 
damage, and therefore, the letters are irrelevent. 
The letter of June 7, Exhibit "G", explains Mr. Mc-
Farland's position long ofter the transaction, but the 
disposition to do the best he can with a short supply 
item is clear.ly in evidence. The lack of authority of 
the salesrrl'an is in plaintiffs own exhibit. 
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It is submitted that there 1s no evidenee if 
ratification. 
II 
THE PLAINTIFF W AIVE.D HIS RIGHT TO 
DAMAGES FOR THE D·EFICIENCIES IN THE 
FIRST FIVE SHIPMENTS: 
If the honorable court should dis.agree with our 
contentions and find as did the lower eourt that a 
binding contract was made between the p·arties, then 
we submit the ·proposition that even if such were 
true, the plaintiff, by his acts of aceeptance, without 
notice to the defendant of any deficiencies or breach 
or an,v complaint whatsoever until January 9, 1948, 
waived his rights to the deficiencies in the shipments 
and is estopped to now recover damages for them. 
Utah Code .Section 81..;3-9 states .as follows" In 
the absence of express or implied ag:reem,ent of the 
parties acceptance of the goods by th,e buyer shall 
not discharge the seller from liability in damages, 
or other !legal remedy from breach of any promise 
or warranty in the contract to sell or the sale. But 
if after aceeptance of the goods the buyer fails to 
give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise 
or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer 
knows, or ought to know, of such breach, the seller 
shall not be liable therefor." 
This is identical to S·ect. 49 of the Uniform 
Sales Act, also the Law of California. 
A similar statement of the law is repeated in 
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the the American Law Institute Restatement of Con-
tracts' number 412: . 
''Discharge of a Se~lers Duty After Buyers 
Acceptance of Goods.'' 
''Under- a contract for the sale of goods, 
the failure of the .buyer, .after acceptance of 
goods tendered as performance of the con-
tract, to give notice to the seller of the latter's 
breach of any promise of warranty, within a 
reasonable time after the buyer knows or has 
reason to know of such breach, discharges the 
seller's duty to make compensation." 2 Restate-
ment of Contracts 777 
The Courts uniformly hold under such statutory 
provisions requiring notice of breach of warranty 
that as a pre-requisite to a recovery for a breach 
of warranty the purehaser must give notice to the 
seller of such breach within a reasonable tin1e after 
he knew, or under the circumstances, should haYe 
• 
known of the breach. 
Truslo & Futle, v. Diarntond Bottling Co. 71 
AI_jR 114~, with full annotation, 1149; 112 Conn. 
181; 151 Atl 4:92. 
V~illiston in his treatise on the law of .Sales Sec. 
484-B states in regard to this section of the Sales Act 
applied to deferred delivery. ''It might be urged that 
the seller needs no notice in case of delivery delayed 
beyond date expressly fixed in the contract, for he 
must he a"'-Yare that he is viollating the provisions 
of the contract, but though he knows this he does not 
know whether the buyer is willing to accept deferred 
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delivery as full satisfartion, and in any event the words 
of the Statute seem plain." 
3 '''illiston on Sales, Rev. Ed. 41 
In the Dia ntond Bottli·n!J (~o. case, supra, the . 
reas-on for such no tire is stated as follows: 
''The purpose of the provision requir-
ing such a notice is clearly to give the seller 
timely information that the buyer proposes 
to 'look to him f.or damages for the breach 
that the former may govern his ·conduct ac-
cordingly.'' 
Here, plaintiff kne"\v he had dealt in a critical 
item. available elsewhere to him, but -possibly not to 
the defendant. ''Tith the rising ·price situation also 
known to the plaintiff, it was elearly his duty to notify 
defendant as the shipments came in short of his ex-
pectations, and not delay for a month. Thus his 
failure to timely complain, if there he found a 
rontract, amounts to a waiver of a right to receive 
the balanc-e of the weekly shipment. 
III 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROPERLY 
GATE 1} .. '-\l\f.L<\GES: THE ,JUDGEMENT 
l\IONEY IS EXCESSIVE. 
MITI-
F'OR 
If there was a contract and it was viorlated for 
failure to deliver meat, plaintiff by law may enter 
the market and purchase, charging defendant the 
difference between the contract price and the mar-
ket price in which he bought. However, for him to 
do this, there are steps he must follow, and this 
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we submit he has failed to do. 
The law is generally stated 1n 46 Am. Jur. 830 
as follows: 
"The general rule that a party injured by 
breach of contract is not entitled to recover 
from the delinquent party damages which he 
eould with reasonap!le effort or e~pense have 
avoided is applicable in actions by the buyer 
for the seller's breach with respect to delivery, 
and under this rule the buyer may recover 
only the damages he would have suffered if 
he had o htained elsewher-e goods like those the 
seller has failed or refused to deliver.'' 
Warren v. Stoddard 105 U.S. 224. 
This same :principle is found in the Uniform 
Sales Act, a part of the Utah and the California law 
as follows: 
'' * * * where * * * the sell·er wr·ongfullly 
refuses to deliver the goods, the buyer may 
m·aintain an action against the s·eller f.or 
. damages for nondelivery * * * 
"Where there is an available market for 
the goods in question, the measure of damages, 
in the absence of special circumstances sho·w-
ing proximate damages of a greater amount, 
is the diff.erenee between the -contract price and 
the market price ·or current price of the 
goods at the time or times when they ought to 
hav-e been delivered, or, if no time was fixed, 
then at the time of the refusal to deliver.'' 
Utah Code Annutated, 1943, 81-5-5 
Thus under the statute, plaintiff may possibly 
recover. I-Iowever, he ha~: the burden of showing eoln-
pliance. He must purchase the goods in the market, if 
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they are aYailable at the time of the failure to deliver, 
or at the time of the refusal to deliver. This he did 
not do, but did it months later during a time of rising 
market. It is subn1itted he did not mitigate ihis dama-
ges. He accentuated them by what he did . 
.... \ccording to the theory of the plaintiff there was 
a failure to ship ordered mutton at the rate of a mini-
mum of 3000 pounds per week beginning N overr.tber 
~. 1947. 
The fir~t shipment was deficient 149 pounds; 
the second ~,916 pounds; the third 1800 pounds; t~he 
fourth 2600 pounds; the fifth 2336. pounds; and the 
sixth 2668 pounds._ Between the fifth and sixth ship-
ment three weekly shipments were missed entirely. 
Thus the defendant failed to deliver a- total of 21,459 
pounds in these shipments and yet the plaintiff did not 
attempt, so he pleaded and proved, to mitigate this 
default until approximately three months after the 
last shipment. During all this time, the plain tiff did 
not contact the defendant about these deficiencies unti] 
January 9, 1948. 
Now checking with the statute, was there a. supply 
of product available to plaintiff during the tim·es of 
the deficiency~ Plaintiff himself testified that it was 
"always available to him." (R. 41) He stated that he 
might have purchased elsewhere in both December, 
1947, and January, 1948. (R. 63) He stated that at 
the time he contracted with defendant the product 
was available at the same price elsewhere. (R. 46) 
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On pages 67 Moses said that meat was not in short 
supply and that "there was plenty of it available." 
When the meat is available, there is a time limit 
set in the statute when he must buy, to wit, "at the 
time fixed for delivery, or at the time of the refusal 
to deliver." If plaintiff had the contract he ·claimed 
he had, there was a deficiency right from the first 
shipment to the last. The time to make the purchase, 
in true mitigation of the damage, was when the in-
dividual shipments came in short. With the market 
rising, he stood by and allowed it to rise, instead of 
entering the available market open to him and cutting 
down the loss to plaintiff. Plaintiff should have pur-
chased in mitigation beginning with November 8th 
the difference between mutton received ~and the 3000 
pounds expected. 
It will be ·argued that defendant by his statements 
on the January 9th phone conversation, and by the 
letter, Exhibit '' D·", encouraged plaintiff to still hope 
for the product, after the several breaches. It is 
submitted that this is not an answer to the law re-
quiring plaintiff to enter the market a_t the time of the 
refusal to deliver. It is defendant's testimony undis-
puted, and corrobor~ated by the plaintiff, that no 
mutton was available to the defendant. He told plain-
tiff plainly by phone that no product "ras available 
(R. 28), that it "rould be ''weeks" before any would be 
poRsible of shipment (R. 57). He wrote also in Exhibit 
'' D '', ''it is almost ~mpossiblP to obtain ·any mutton 
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Moses testified that on J'anuary 9, he was aware 
that defendant "~as '~tightly pressed" and that Mc-
Farland ''told me he had no more supply at that time.'' 
(R. 56) That \Yas the time for plaintiff to enter the 
market. 
i\fcFarland told plaintiff he would still do his 
best, that there was a possibility that some herds 
might be culled in the future, but this was clearly 
speculative. (Exhibit "D ") This was the final time 
the alleged contract vYas repudiated. Me Farland testi-
fied that in this :phone conversation he told Moses 
there was no firm contract, but only an open orded. 
(R. 91) T~his was also a time when defendant ''refused 
to deliver", if it is not deemed that there wa.s a refusal 
at the time of the alleged short shipments. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the lower court erred in enter-
ing its findings that there was a contract between the 
parties for the reason that: 
1. The s~alesman had no authority to make a con-
tract, and that in fact he made no contract. 
2. That defendant had the right to accept or re-
ject any orders submitted, and that here it rejecteci 
the offer, and gave a counteroffer to ship as available. 
Full and faithful performanee was effected thereunder. 
3. The shipments m·ade by defendant did not con-
VPrt the former offer into an acceptance. 
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4. There was no ratification. 
5. Even though the court finds there was a con-
tract, the judgment is far in excess of what should be 
because the plaintiff did not properly mitigate his 
damages. 
Defendant prays that the court reverse the judg-
ment below. The least this court should do is remand 
with instructions to require plaintiff to produce his 
evidence of purchases so as to meet his burden of prov-
ing a true mitigation of damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WARWICK C. LAMOREAUX 
DAVID K. WATKISS 
At'torneys for Defendant. 
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